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the rights and liabilities of the parties. Courts have held that even where no
policy is stated, considered with all the other circumstances, congressional
silence should indicate the desire to keep state law as the determinative body
of rules. 42
 The perfected security interest held by the United States was
created under the laws of Pennsylvania. Because the rights and interests of
the parties are created by state law, that same law should also decide the
liabilities and obligations. If Congress felt that the loan program under the
Bankhead-Jones Act would be hampered, then it could have provided for a
security interest based on a federal right. The court in Sommerville saw a
federal interest and twisted the Clearfield doctrine to fit their decision. It
disregarded two well reasoned opinions," and relied heavily on a decision
for which no. reason was given," because whether federal or state law
should be applied was not there in issue. Even though the result would be
the same whether federal or state law was applied in the main case, the
importance of this decision is not lessened. The next case involving a secu-
rity agreement or chattel mortgage held by the United States under the
FHA Loan Program might call for a different result under the appropriate
state law.
ROBERT I. DEUTSCH
Insurance—Pre-Existing Disease—Insurer's Contractual Liability in
Accident Policies.—Miles v. Continental Cos. Co, 1—Plaintiff-benefici-
ary brought an action for recovery under a Health and Accident Policy
which provided for the payment of $5,000 for death from "bodily injury
caused by accident" and "resulting directly and independently of all other
causes."2 Decedent-insured had accidentally sustained a fracture of his left
femur, and subsequent X-rays revealed the presence of cancerous growth
in the immediate area of the injury. Medical testimony disclosed that: (1)
the cancer was malignant, metastatic, and present in the area prior to the
fracture rather than trauma induced; (2) the cancer was active and not
dormant, and would have caused the insured's death irrespective of the
fracture; (3) although the fracture itself could not directly and independ-
42 United States v. Kramel, supra note 28, at 581.
48 Supra notes 31 and 35.
44 Supra note 28.
— Wyo. —, 386 P.2d 720 (1963).
2 Although the court characterized it as an "Accident and Health Policy," Conti-
nental Casualty Company classified the contract as a "Business and Professional Dis-
ability Policy." The two relevant clauses are as follows: '
(1) Definition of injury
"Injury" wherever used in this policy means bodily injury caused by
accident occurring while this policy is in force and resulting directly and
independently of all other causes in loss covered by this policy.
(2) Death provision
When injury results in loss of life of the Insured within 100 days
after the date of the accident the Company will pay the Loss of Life
Accident Indemnity stated in the Schedule.
It should be noted that the company had previously paid claims under the policy for
hospitalization, medical treatment, and per diem expenses.
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ently of the cancer have caused death, it did in fact accelerate it by aiding
the spread of the cancer to other parts of the body; and (4) the cancer was
the immediate cause of death. The trial court in setting aside a verdict
favorable to the plaintiff entered a judgment n.o.v. for the defendant-
insurer. On appeal the Supreme Court of Wyoming affirmed, and in finding
that the plaintiff had failed to "demonstrate a bodily injury resulting in
death from accident" 3 HELD• (I) notwithstanding the fact that the ac-
cidental injury accelerated the fatal effect of the pre-existing cancer, where
both the injury and the pre-existing disease or infirmity were found to be
proximate causes of the death, recovery would be denied; (2) that since
the cancer was "active" and "virulent" and found to be a contributing
cause of the insured's death, it was necessary for the plaintiff to prove that
it was not also a proximate cause of death; 4 (3) as the record left no
reasonable doubt that the cancer was a proximate cause of death, the trial
court was warranted in disposing of the issue as a matter of law.
Attempted recovery under policies containing "sole clause" provisions, 5
which award benefits for accidental death resulting "directly and independ-
ently of all other causes," has produced a plethora of litigation. Generally,
little difficulty has arisen in finding the insurer liable in cases where the in-
sured had been free from any pre-existing ailment prior to sustaining an ac-
cidental injury, or where the effects of the accident have produced a diseased
condition or bodily infirmity which in turn has caused the death or dis-
ability of the insured.° However, in attempting to determine whether the
insured's loss has resulted from accidental means within the terms of the
contract, 7 an array of divergent authority has evolved from cases where the
effects of an accidental injury have aggravated or combined with a pre-
existing condition to produce the death or disability.8
3 Supra note 1, at 723.
4 The death certificate stated that "Respiratory Failure" was the immediate cause
of death due to a cancerous condition in the lungs which had become infected after
the cancer had spread from other parts of the body. (Metastatic Osteogenic Sarcoma,
due to Osteogenic Sarcoma Femur.)
5 Basically there are two types of accident insuring clauses:
(1) "Sole Clause"—This is a standard feature of most policies, generally insuring
against death or injury resulting "directly and independently from all other causes," or
"solely and exclusively from accidental means." This language is sometimes supplemented
by the language, "solely by external, violent, and accidental means."
(2) "Exclusionary Clause"—This type of clause is generally included in addition
to the "sole clause" to render further protective language for the insurer in an attempt
to exclude risks from various areas. Parts of these clauses attempting to exclude
contributing effects from pre-existing conditions generally read, e.g., "if death or
injury is caused or contributed to by disease or bodily infirmity," or "wholly or in
part from disease or bodily infirmity." Others exclude liability unless death results
"directly and independently from disease or bodily infirmity."° E.g., Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Kelly, 70 F.2d 589 (8th Cir. 1934); Barnett v. John
Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 304 Mass. 564, 24 N.E.2d 662 (1939). See generally,
Freeman v. Mercantile Mut. Acc. Ass'n, 156 Mass. 351, 30 N.E. 1013 (1892); Hutchinson
v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 182 Ore. 639, 189 P.2d 586 (1948).
7 See Vance, Insurance 977 (3d ed. 1951).
8 See Annot., 84 A.L.R.2d 176 (1961) for a detailed analysis of the divergent
approaches to the problem of causation.
797
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL' AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
One line of authority, in applying a strict and literal meaning to the
language of the insuring clause, has generally precluded recovery where the
accident was not found to have been the "sole" and "independent" cause
of the insured's death or injury.° This narrow view achieved primary signif-
icance in Penn v. Standard Life & Acc. Ins. Co.?° where the court es-
tablished the policy of denying recovery when the effect of a pre-existing
disease or infirmity was found to be a "necessary condition" to the loss in-
curred by the insured. Courts adhering to the Penn approach have tended
to apply the "necessary condition" rule indiscriminately without regard to
the nature or character of the pre-existing ailment?' Furthermore, they
have apparently added a mechanical "but for" test to the foregoing ration-
ale; thus, when it is determined that a pre-existing condition has been a
"necessary" one in the causal chain, and the insured would not have died
when he did but for the disease or infirmity, recovery is generally pre-
cluded."
However, the majority of jurisdictions have recognized that ultimate
death or disability rarely results exclusively from accidental means "in-
dependently of all other causes," and have deviated from a strict construc-
tion of the insuring clauses. Instead, they have employed the familiar tort
doctrine of proximate causation to determine the causal relationship between
the accidental injury, the pre-existing condition, and the resultant death
or disability." These jurisdictions have been strongly influenced by the
rationale generated in Driskell v. United States Health & Acc. Ins. Co.,"
where the court in formulating its celebrated doctrine stated:
. . . the fact that a given injury may not be generally lethal does
not prevent it from becoming so under certain conditions; and if
under a peculiar temperment or condition of health of an individual
upon whom it is inflicted, such injury appears [as] the active,
efficient cause that sets in motion agencies that result in death,
without the intervention of any other independent force, then it
should be regarded as the sole and proximate cause of death. The
9 Ryan v. Continental Cas. Co., 47 F.2d 472 (5th Cir. 1931) ; Aetna Life Ins.
Co. v. Ryan, 255 Fed. 483 (2d Cir. 1918) ; Commercial Travelers' Mut. Acc. Ass'n
v. Fulton, 79 Fed. 423 (2d Cir. 1897) ; National Masonic Acc. Ass'n v. Shryock, 73 Fed.
774 (8th Cir. 1896) (exclusionary clause) ; White v. Standard Life & Acc. Ins. Co.,
95 Minn. 77, 103 N.W. 735 (1905).
to 158 N.C. 24, 73 S.E. 99 (1911), supplemental opinion rendered, 160 N.C. 326,
76 S.E. 262 (1912) (accidental fall hastened loss of eyesight in one eye with a previous
cataract).
11 E.g., Crowder v. General Acc. Fire and Life Assur. Corp., 180 Va. 117,
21 S.E.2d 772 (1942). Cf. Leland v. Order of United Comm. Travelers, 213 Mass.
558, 124 N.E. 517 (1919).
12 E.g., Bush v. Order of United Comm. Travelers of America, 124 F.2d 528 (2d
Cir. 1942). Cf. Fetter v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 174 Mo. 256, 73 S.W. 592 (1903).
13 Courts employing the doctrine of proximate causation generally construe the
terminology "independently of all other causes" to mean accidental injury which was
the proximate cause of the resultant death. On this point see Cramer v. John Hancock
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 18 N.J. Misc. 367, 377, 13 A.2d 651, 656 (1940). See also Freeman
v. Mercantile Mut. Acc. Ass'n, supra note 6.
'4 117 Mo. App. 362, 93 S.W. 880 (1906).
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fact that the physical infirmity of the victim may be a necessary
condition to the result does not deprive the injury of its dis-
tinction as the sole producing cause. In such case, disease and low
vitality do not arise to the dignity of concurring causes, but, in
having deprived nature of her normal power of resistance to attack,
appear rather as passive allies of the agencies set in motion by
the injury. (Emphasis supplied.)' 5
The Driskell holding is apparently the direct antithesis of that enunciated
in the Penn case, and these cases have since been the predominant forces
responsible for the polarization of authority in this area. Cases following
the Penn rule have tended to preclude recovery as a matter of law where
the pre-existing ailment was found to be a "necessary condition," whereas
courts closely adhering to the Driskell approach have generally awarded
relief where the jury has determined the accidental effects to be the "proxi-
mate cause" of the insured's death or injury." Although some courts in
following Driskell have gone so far as to award recovery on a "but for the
accident" basis," many others in directing more attention to the nature,
character, and causal effect of the pre-existing condition have attempted
to draw a legal distinction between those conditions which are remote
causes and those which are, in fact, proximate causes." Generally, pre-
existing ailments which are found to be latent or dormant in nature are
deemed to be remote causes, whereas those which are active, virulent, and
life-endangering are more apt to be designated as proximate causes." Under
this line of reasoning, where a latent or dormant ailment becomes activated
by the agencies released from the accidental injury and combines with that
injury to produce death, the accident is deemed to be the proximate factor
—and recovery is generally granted." However, where the pre-existing con-
19 Id. at 369, 93 S.W. at 882.
16 For cases adopting the Driskell rationale, see generally Wheeler v. Fidelity &
Cas. Co., 298 Mo. 619, 251 S.W. 924 (1923); Fetter v. Fidelity Cas. Co., supra note
12; Foulkrod v. Standard Acc. Ins. Co., 343 Pa. 505, 23 A.2d 430 (1942); Kelly v.
Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 334 Pa. 143, 6 A.2d 55 (1939); Kelly v. Pittsburgh
Cas. Co., 256 Pa. 1, 100 Atl. 494 (1917). See also, Rebenstorf v. Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co., 299 III. App. 71, 19 N.E.2d 420 (1939).
17 E.g., Roberts v. Woodmen Acc. Co., 233 Mo. App. 1058, 129 S.W.2d 1053
(1939). See Comment, Pre-existing Disease and Accident Insurance: Pathology and
Metaphysics in the Common Speech of Men, 21 U. Chi. L. Rev. 266 (1954).
18 Two of the foremost cases in this area are: Silverstein v. Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co., 254 N.Y. 81, 171 N.E. 914 (1930) and Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of United States
v. Gratlot, 45 Wyo. 1, 14 P.2d 438 (1932). For one view illustrating the effect of an
exclusionary clause on this distinction see Illinois Comm. Men's Ass'n v. Parks, 179
Fed. 794 (7th Cir. 1910).
19 Compare Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of United States v. Gratiot (remote
anurysm), supra note 18, with Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Deposit Guar. Bank
and Trust, — Miss. —, 151 So. 2d 816 (1963) (active, virulent heart ailment).
Compare Kievit v. Loyal Protective Life Ins. Co. (latent, inactive), infra note 23,
with Runyon v. Commonwealth Cas. Co., 109 N.J. 238, 160 Att. 402 (1932) (patent,
active).
zo E.g., United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Hood, 124 Miss. 548, 87 So. 115 (1921);
Driskell v. United Health & Acc. Ins. Co., supra note 14. But cf. Adkins v. American
Cas. Co., 145 W. Va. 281, 114 S.E.2d 556 (1960).
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dition is found to be the proximate cause, in that it was of such an active
and virulent character as to play a substantial contributing role in the
death of the insured apart'from the effects produced by the accident—then
recovery is generally denied?'
Although the inclusion of an exclusionary clause 22 in the terms of a
policy has often failed to narrow the scope of the insurable risk, 28
 there is
a line of authority which adopts a literal construction of the exclusionary
clause and bars recovery in any instance where the pre-existing condition,
regardless of its nature, was found to play a contributing role in the re-
sultant death or disability?' In fact, the existence of an exdusionary clause
has influenced some jurisdictions to refute the doctrine of proximate causa-
tion and permit recovery only where the accidental injury was shown to be
the "sole cause" of the ultimate loss?' These latter courts, however, do em-
ploy the doctrine in determining whether the loss has resulted solely from
accidental means."
21 E.g., Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Deposit Guar. Bank and Trust, supra note
19. This situation should be compared to those cases where there was no causal rela-
tion found between a pre-existing incurable disease and the resultant death. E.g., Kun-
diger v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 219 Minn. 25, 17 N.W.2d 49 (1944) ; Klinke
v. Great Northern Life Ins. Co., 318 III. App. 43, 47 N.E.2d 506 (1943).
22 Supra note 5.
28 This position was exemplified in Kievit v. Loyal Protective Life Ins. Co. 34
N.J. 475, 488, 170 A.2d 22, 30 (1961), where the court stated:
[W]e attach little significance to the presence of the exclusionary clause in
view of the primary provision limiting coverage to loss from accidental bodily
injuries, directly and independently of all other causes.
. . . the courts goal in construing an accident insurance policy is to effectuate
the reasonable expectations of the average member of the public who buys it;
he may hardly be expected to draw any subtle or legal distinctions based on'
the presence or absence of the exclusionary clause for he pays premiums in the
strong belief that if he sustains accidental injury which results .. . in his dis-
ability he will be indemnified and not left empty-handed on the company's
assertion that his disability was caused or contributed to by a latent disease
or condition of which he was unaware and did not effect him before the
accident.
See Krug v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York, 235 Mo. App. 1224, 149 S.W.2d 393
(1941), where the court labeled the exclusionary provision as a "redundant clause."
24 Brown v. United States Fid. Sr Guar: Co., 336 Mass. 609, 147 N.E.2d 160 (1958)
(diabetes determined to have been a "contributing cause" of death); Fries v. John
Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 227 Ore. 139, 360 P.2d 774 (1961); 41 Ore. L. Rev.
348 (1962).
26 In Kundiger v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 218 Minn. 273, 281, 15 N.W.2d 487,
493 (1944), the court explained this reasoning:
The rule of proximate cause as applied to actions of negligence, cannot, how-
ever, be applied in its full scope to the contract of this nature. . . . This is
true because under the parties' express contract a recovery can be had only
if death resulted "solely" (not proximately) from injury[ies] received through
accidental means, and, if the insured's condition was a contributing cause,
there can be no recovery.
For other Minnesota cases following this view, see Ryan v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,
206 Minn. 562, 289 N.W. 557 (1939); Ackermann v. Minn. Comm. Men's Ass'n,
184 Minn. 522, 239 N.W. 229 (1931); White v. Standard Life & Acc. Ins. Co., supra
note 9.
26 For an example illustrating how courts may disagree over the distinction between
800
CASE NOTES
The holding in the case at bar, precluding recovery because in incurable
pre-existing disease was found to "arise to the dignity" of a substantial con-
tributing cause (proximate cause) in the death of the insured, appears to
adhere to the guideposts ! initially set forth in Wyoming in Equitable Life
Assur. Soc. of United States v. Gratiot.27 There the plaintiff -beneficiary
was successful in obtaining recovery under a double indemnity , provision
where the insured-deceased had died from a cerebral hemorrhage after
sustaining injuries in an automobile accident. Medical testimony disclosed
that a rupture, which caused ultimate death, had occurred at a point in
the basilar artery where an aneurysm had existed prior to the accident.
Testimony also revealed that the aneurysm was "lateht" or "dormant"
in nature, but was conflicting in regards to its causal relation to the insured's
death. The insurer contended that the exclusionary language of the insuring
clause precluded recovery where the insured had been afflicted with a pre-
existing bodily infirmity. 28 In rejecting the insurer's strict interpretation of
the insurable risk, the court pointed out that a distinction must be drawn
between remote and proximate causes in determining the causal effect of the
pre-existing infirmity.29 In relying on Lemos v. Madden, 3° Judge Blume
attempted to distinguish between the two by stating:
[P]roximate cause is probable cause, and remote cause is im-
probable cause. . . . The criterion laid down by some of the courts
is ... whether it can be said to have been a substantially contrib-
uting cause. . . . A condition which could not reasonably be ex-
pected to endanger, and which, but for some independent cause
without which the injury would not have occurred, would not have ,
endangered, does not ordinarily amount to a, proximate cause.
(Emphasis supplied.) 81
the phraseology found in "sole" and "exclusionary" clauses, and the different legal effects
possible from each, compare Illinois Comm. Men's Ass'n v. Parks, supra note 18,
(as summarized by Fidelity Cas. Co. v. Meyer, infra note 43, at 98, 152 S.W. at 998:
The phrase, "resulting directly, independently and exclusively in death," refers '
to the efficient, or, as some courts speak of it, the predominant, cause of
death. . . . In other words, it means the proximate cause; whereas, the other
phrase employed in some policies excepting liability where death has resulted,
"wholly or in part, directly or indirectly, from disease or bodily infirmity,"
refers to another contributing cause, whether proximate or remote.)
with Kerns v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 291 Fed. 289, 292 (8th Cir. 1923) which stipulated:
[Ili is difficult, if not impossible, to eke out any legal distinction between
death which results directly and independently of all other causes, and death
caused wholly or in part from disease or bodily infirmity.
27 45 Wyo. 1, 14 P.2d 438 (1932).
28 The policy awarded benefits for accidental death, "of bodily injuries effectuated
solely through external, violent and 'accidental means. . . ." It also contained an ex-
clusionary provision barring recovery unless death from bodily injuries was one "re-
sulting directly or indirectly from bodily or mental infirmity. . . ."
29 In reaching this conclusion, the court was strongly influenced by the rationale
generated in the Silverstein and Driskell cases.
80 28 Wyo. 1, 200 Pac. 791 (1921).
at Supra note 27, at 23, 14 P.2d at 445. See, Eberhardt v. Masco Mut. Tel. Men,
91 Kan. 763, 139 Pac. 416 (1914).
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From this interplay of legalistic logic he then stipulated the mandate of
the decision:
[I] f a disease, bodily infirmity, or predisposing cause in fact ex-
isted, as claimed, still unless it can be said to be one of the proxi-
mate causes instead of only the remote cause . . . recovery should
not, on that account, be denied. 32
In Bankers Life Co. v. Nelson,33
 plaintiff-beneficiary was awarded re-
covery under a double indemnity provision of a policy containing an exclu-
sionary clause.84
 The insured-decedent, who had been afflicted with a pre-
existing thinness of his heart wall (determined to be of latent and dormant
character), sustained a hernia there during an accident and subsequently
died of heart failure. The Wyoming Supreme Court reaffirmed the reasoning
of Gratiot:
This court has already decided that latent or dormant bodily
weakness in itself, on the part of the claimant, is insufficient to
be regarded as the proximate cause of a death or injury where the
accident sets in motion consequences which otherwise would not
have ensued if such latent or dormant condition had not existed. 35
In adopting this rationale, the court in Miles had little difficulty in dis-
tinguishing the situation on hand from those presented in Gratiot and Nelson.
In the latter cases the pre-existing conditions were inactive, latent, and
dormant and therefore easily found to constitute remote causes; whereas in
Miles, the cancer was determined to be malignant, active, virulent, and in-
curable and therefore constituted a substantial contributing factor (proxi-
mate cause) in the insured's death. Furthermore, in Gratiot and Nelson, the
latent defects did not impose any immediate threat of death until they
became activated by the agencies released from the accident, whereas in
Miles the cancerous condition was already activated and life-endangering
prior to the accidental injury. As such, it could hardly be said that the
fracture was the active and efficient cause that set in motion the agencies
which resulted in death. 36
 Where a pre-existing condition was shown to be
32 Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of United States v. Gratiot, supra note 27, at 23,
14 P.2d at 445.
38 56 Wyo. 243, 108 P.2d 584 (1940), rehearing denied, 56 Wyo. 513, 111 P.2d
136 (1941).
34 The exclusionary clause contained in the Double Indemnity provision in essence
provided: "This double indemnity benefit will not apply if the insured's death re-
sulted from . . . physical or mental infirmity, directly or indirectly from disease of any
kind."
35 Bankers Life Co. v. Nelson, supra note 33, at 256, 108 P.2d at 588.
36 This line of reasoning is supported in Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Deposit
Guar. Bank and Trust, supra note 19, where the Mississippi Supreme Court in ap-
plying a strict interpretation to the insuring clause, precluded recovery where it was
found that the insured-decedent had been afflicted with an "active" and "virulent"
heart ailment "likely to cause death at any time." In adopting an approach similar to
Miles, the court also distinguished the situation on hand, where the active heart ail-
ment was found to play a substantial role in the insured's death, from those cases
where a latent or dormant condition becomes activated by the agencies released from the
accident. Cf. United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Hood, supra note 20.
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a contributing factor in the ultimate death, it was essential for the plaintiff
to demonstrate that such was not also a proximate cause in the death?'
The plaintiff, in Miles, failed to meet this latter burden and thus failed to
demonstrate a death resulting from accidental cause within the coverage of
the policy.
Although it was established in Miles that the accidental fracture had
in fact hastened the fatal effect of the cancerous condition, the court, in
following the authority of Gratiot,38 refused to extend the coverage of the
policy to cases where death has been accelerated by accidental effects. 39 A
similar result was reached in Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Lowe," where
the court, in acknowledging the fact that the accidental injury had accelerated
the death of an insured previously afflicted with incurable cancer, held that
the death loss did not fall within the language of the policy containing an
exclusionary clause. Although in Lowe, and in other cases involving similar
insuring clauses, recovery was precluded primarily because of the additional
exclusionary language,'" there is also a substantial body of authority in-
volving "sole clauses" which have refused to recognize the doctrine of accel-
eration where the combined effects of both the pre-existing condition and
the accidental injury have produced death.42
The doctrine of acceleration has been adopted in a few jurisdictions
which recognize an insurable value in the shortened life expectancy of the
insured in cases where the accidental effects have accelerated the fatal con-
dition of a pre-existing ailment. Apparently, these courts have proceeded
upon the theory that if the accidental injury accelerates death, then it must
37 In support of this holding the court cited Pettit v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co.,
277 S.W.2d 857 (Mo. 1955); Lucas v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 339 Pa. 277, 14
A.2d 85 (1940); and Worley v. International Travelers Assur. Co., 110 S.W.2d 1202
(Tex. Civ. App. 1937). Generally, when the plaintiff has demonstrated that the death
had resulted from accidental means (in accordance to the sufficiency of evidence re-
quired by the particular court), then the insurer, in his defense, must usually show
the loss to have fallen within some exception of the policy in order to bar recovery.
38 Supra note 27.
33 The Defendant-Appellee pointed out in his brief, and the court agreed, that the
problem of acceleration was not a legal issue under Wyoming Law; the main question
being "Whether the cancerous condition was the proximate or a remote cause of his
death, or whether it was directly contributing in a substantial nature to ... death...,"
(p. 13).
40 313 Ky. 126, 230 S.W.2d 466 (1950).
41 In New York Life Ins. Co. v. Rees, 341 S.W.2d 246 (Ky. 1960) (arteriosclerosis,
heart ailment, poor life expectancy), the court followed Lowe in holding that notwith-
standing the fact that the injury contributed or accelerated death, the plaintiff still had
the burden to demonstrate an accidental injury which was the "exclusive" and "in-
dependent" cause of the insured's death. In Miller v. Life & Cas. Co. of Tenn., 102
Ga. App. 655, 117 S.E.2d 237 (1960) (hemophilia), where the policy involved contained
a narrowly drawn clause—"if death is not caused or contributed to by disease or in-
firmity"; the court held that the plaintiff had the burden to show that death was
caused from accidental injury independent of the insured's pre-existing infirmity, and
if it was shown that such resulted from the combined effects of both the injury and the
infirmity—then recovery would be denied.
42 E.g., Smith v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 207 App. Div. 682, 202 N.Y.
Supp. 857, aff'd, 241 N.Y. 558, 150 N.E. 554 (1929). See generally, Annot., 84
A.L.R.2d 176 11 (1961). Cf. Fetter v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., supra note 12.
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be held to be the proximate and sole cause of death. In achieving its primary
significance in Alabama and Arkansas, the theoretical underpinnings of this
doctrine were formulated in Fidelity Cas. Co. v. Meyer," where the court
stated:
[I] f the injury, by aggravating the disease, accelerated the death
of the assured, then it resulted "directly, independently, and
exclusively of all other causes." (sole clause terms) In other words,
if death would not have occurred when it did, but for the injury
resulting from the accident, it was the direct, independent and ex-
clusive cause of death at that time, even though the death was
hastened by the diseased condition. (Emphasis supplied.)"
Although this liberal rule was promulgated in circumstances involving a
"latent" cancerous growth, it appears that subsequent cases in both Arkansas
and other jurisdictions have applied it indiscriminately to situations where
the pre-existing ailment was active or terminal, rather than latent or remote.45
The Meyer rule is so well established in Arkansas" that it has even been
employed in cases involving exclusionary clauses 4 7 In Alabama, however,
although the Meyer rule has had substantial influence," there has been a
43 106 Ark. 91, 152 S.W. 995 (1912).
44 Id. at 96, 152 S.W. at 997. In Clay County Cotton Co. v. Home Life Ins. Co. of
New York, 113 F.2d 856 (8th Cir. 1940) (sole clause), the court held it was a question
for the jury to determine whether the insured would not have died when he did, ex-
cept for the accident. In Moon v. Order of United Comm. Travelers of America,
96 Neb. 65, 146 N.W. 1037 (1914), the court held the accident to constitute the prox-
imate cause of death, where it was shown (notwithstanding the insured's arteries had
been weakened by sclerosis. prior to the trauma), but for the accident, the insured
would have lived many more years. Accord, United States Cas. Co. v. Thrush, 21
Ohio App. 129, 152 N.E. 796 (1926). Cf. Defendant-Appellee's argument, supra note
39.
45 Life & Cas. Co. of Tenn. v. Jones, 230 Ark, 979, 985, 328 S.W.2d 118, 122
(1959):
Our exhaustive research reveals the •law to be well settled in this state
that an insurance company is liable ... if death resulted when it did on ac-
count of an aggravation of a disease by accidental injury, even though death
from the disease might have resulted at a later period regardless of the injury,
on the theory that if death would not have occurred when it did but for the
injury, the accident was the direct, independent and exclusive cause of death
at that time.
However, in Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Fairchild, 215 Ark. 416, 220
S.W.2d 803 (1949), the court did stipulate that death had resulted from the aggrava-
tion of a "latent" disease when directing its instructions to the jury.
46 Some of the cases in Arkansas following the Meyer rule which are not elsewhere
cited include: Fidelity Reserve Ins. Co. v. English, 226 Ark. 210, 288 S.W.2d 951 (1956);
Union Life Ins. Co. v. Epperson, 221 Ark. 522, 254 S.W.2d 311 (1953); Duke v. Life
& Cas. Co. of Tenn., 218 Ark. 686, 238 S.W.2d 631 (1951); National Life & Acc.
Ins. Co. v. Shibley, 192 Ark. 53, 90 S.W.2d 766 (1936); Missouri State Life Ins. Co. v.
Barron, 186 Ark. 46, 52 S.W.2d 733 (1932); Maloney v. Maryland Cas. Co., 113
Ark. 174, 167 S.W. 845 (1914).
47 E.g., Life & Cas. Ins. Co. of Tenn. v. Jones, supra note 45.
48 The rule as stated in Benefit Ass'n of Ry. Employees v. Armbruster, 217 Ala.
282, 116 So. 164, 166 (1928) (sole clause) reads:
[W]here accidental injury aggravated a disease and hastened death so as to
cause it to occur at an earlier period than it would have occurred but for the
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reluctance to extend its application to exclusionary clause situations." The
doctrine of acceleration, as advocated in Meyer, has stirred considerable con-
troversy in numerous opinions, but because of its tendency to inject broad
and liberal implications into the insuring language of the contract, most
jurisdictions have repudiated its legal validity. 50 In the dissenting opinion
of Miles, Judge Harnsberger strongly appealed for the adoption of the Meyer
rule in Wyoming. However, in pointing out the insurable value in the con-
tinuation of life, and in advocating the right of the jury to determine whether
the accidental injury had in fact shortened the insured's life, it is submitted
that he misinterpreted the majority opinion.
First, the dissent overlooked the fact that unlike the general life insurance
contract where the insurable risk is based upon an inevitable certainty—
namely, death—the insured under an accident policy is paying for pro-
'tection to cover an unforeseeable event predicated upon fortuity and chance. 51
Second, the dissent ignored the fact that the courts are confronted with
a situation where two parties have entered into an enforceable contract,
wherein the insurer has expressly stipulated that accidental death must
result from bodily injury "directly and independently of all other causes."
It is true that a literal construction of this language would probably bar
recovery in most instances where the pre-existing condition had some causal
bearing on the insured's death."
Third, the court in Miles has clearly stipulated that only in situations
where the disease or infirmity is "active" and "virulent" will their contrib-
accident, it is the direct, independent, and exclusive cause of death at the
time.
Accord, United Ins. Co. of America v. Ray, 271 Ala. 543, 125 So. 2d 704 (1960).
40 In First Nat'l Bank v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 225 Ala. 588, 144 So. 451 (1932),
the court suggested that but for the exclusionary language in the insuring clause, it
might have granted recovery under the Meyer rule. In Standard Acc. Ins. Co. of Detroit
v. Hoehn, 215 Ala. 109, 110 So. 7 (1926), the court asserted that if the policy in ques-
tion had contained a clear stipulation of exclusionary language concerning death rather
than disability, they would have denied recovery.
5° However, the doctrine of acceleration, allied with the Driskell rule, has in-
fluenced many cases in Missouri. In Horn v. Travelers Ins. Co., 64 F. Supp. 59 (ED.
Mo, 1946), where a trauma sustained in an accident aggravated the insured's cancerous
condition, the court pointed out that the issue whether the accident had caused an
earlier death of the insured should be considered by the court in determining the
liability of the insurer (recovery denied on other provisions of the policy). See
Hooper v. Standard Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 166 Mo. App. 209, 148 S.W. 116 (1912).
51 Vance, op. cit supra note 7, at 944.
52 Wolfangel v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 209 Minn. 439, 441, 296 N.W.
576, 577 (1941), where the court stated:
[A] strict application of the doctrine that the accident must be the sole
and independent cause of death would probably always require a decision for
the insurer since it is seldom, from a medical point of view, that one cause is
solely responsible for death.... This consideration has pursuaded several courts
to distinguish between legal and medical causes and recovery is allowed where-
ever the accident and its effects, acting upon an imperfect state of health, can
be said to be the proximate cause of death.
For the feeling that a contributing cause from the viewpoint of science will not
necessarily be recognized as the proximate cause from a legal standpoint, see Silver-
stein v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., supra note 18; Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of
United States v. Gratiot, supra note 27.
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uting effect be deemed proximate. The holding in Miles has not adopted
the narrow view of the Penn case which excludes recovery where the ailment
is found to be but a "necessary condition" to the ultimate consequences.
Neither does the majority purport to bar recovery upon the mere presence
of an incurable disease when there is no causal relationship between its
agencies and the death of the insured."
Fourth, the dissent failed to realize that it was not the mere presence of
an ailment which defeats recovery, but the causal effect it has on the ultimate
loss is the factor which will extend the situation beyond the risks in the
policy."
Fifth, where the insurable risk is expressly confined to accidental injury
or death resulting "directly and independently of all other causes," it
requires the most imaginative interpretation to imply coverage to situations
where an injury, incapable of itself to render a fatal effect, merely accel-
erated an inevitable, and predetermined result.
Finally, the bare statement by the dissent that there is an insurable
value in the continuation of life is indisputable. It is another matter, how-
ever, to find such a value within the meaning of these insuring clauses in
situations where an accidental injury has accelerated the fatal effect of an
otherwise incurable disease. The adoption of such a view would tend to
lead to further judicial distortion and abrogation of the protective language
of these contracts, and in essence would relegate their coverage to areas and
risks presently insured by the general life insurance contracts es
ALBERT NEIL STIEGLITZ
Labor Law—Consumer Picketing—"Threat, Coercion or Restraint"—
Burr v. NLRB.'—The Wholesale and Warehouse Employees Union called
a strike against Perfection Mattress & Spring Co. in support of their contract
demands. In furtherance of its dispute with Perfection, the Union picketed
retail stores that sold Perfection's products, at entrances commonly used by
customers and employees. Employees of the stores could see the picket line
from inside the stores and had to cross the picket line on their way into
and out of the stores during the course of the day. There had been no
work stoppages nor were there any refusals to handle Perfection's products
at any time by employees of the retail stores.2 Perfection filed charges with
53 Klinke v. Great Northern Life Ins. Co., supra note 21.
54 Justice Cardozo in Silverstein v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., supra note 18, at
84, 171 N.E. at 915, illustrated this point when he coined the celebrated phrase "the
common speech of men" in the following passage:
Something more, however, must be shown to exclude the effects of acddent
from coverage of a policy. The disease or infirmity must be so considerable
or significant that it would be characterized as a disease or infirmity in the
common speech of men. (Emphasis supplied.)
55 See Hancock and Grahame, Are the Courts Destroying the Double Indemnity
and Accidental Death Benefit?, 1951 Ins. L.J. 440.
1 321 F.2d 612 (5th Cir. 1963).
2 There were facts indicating more than just peaceful picketing. At one store,
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